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Abstract: It is usually believed that higher competition, implying more active firms, benefits 
consumers. We show that this may not be the case in an industry with asymmetric cost firms. A rise 
in the number of more cost inefficient firms makes the consumers worse-off in the presence of a 
welfare maximizing tax/subsidy policy. A rise in the number of more cost inefficient firms also 
reduces social welfare. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key Words: Competition; Consumer welfare; Cost asymmetry; Tax 
JEL Classifications: L40; L13; L11; H25; D43 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
It is usually believed that higher product market competition reduces price and benefits the 
consumers (Metzenbaum, 1993 and Hausman and Leibtag, 2007). However, the evidences do 
not support this view always. Caves et al. (1991), Grabowski (1992) and Perloff et al. (2005) 
show that entry triggers price in the US pharmaceutical industry. Using simulations, 
Thomadsen (2007) shows that price in the fast food industry may be higher under duopoly 
than under monopoly. 
We provide an explanation for the price raising effect of higher competition. 
Considering an industry with asymmetric cost firms, we show that a rise in the number of 
more cost inefficient firms makes the consumers worse-off in the presence of a welfare 
maximizing tax/subsidy policy.1  However, the consumers are better off if either the number 
of more cost efficient firms increases or the costs of the more cost inefficient firms reduce. 
 To understand the reasons for our results, let us first consider the situation with no 
tax/subsidy policies of the government. We encounter two types of inefficiencies under 
oligopoly with cost asymmetry. One type of inefficiency is due to the oligopolistic 
competition, and the other type of inefficiency is due to cost asymmetry. If the number of 
firms increases, it tends to reduce the inefficiency due to oligopolistic competition, 
irrespective of the entrant’s marginal cost. If the number of more cost efficient firms 
increases, it also tends to reduce the effect of inefficiency due to cost asymmetry. However, if 
the number of more cost inefficient firms increases, it tends to increase the inefficiency due to 
cost asymmetry. In the absence of tax/subsidy policies, the effect of inefficiency due to 
oligopolistic competition dominates the effect of inefficiency due to cost asymmetry, and 
                                                          
1 The implications of indirect tax in imperfectly competitive markets have been discussed in different contexts. 
See, Suits and Musgrave (1953), Delipalla and Keen (1992), Seade (1985), Stern (1987), Tam (1991) and 
Hamilton (1999) for a representative sample. 
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more firms or lower marginal costs of the more cost inefficient firms increase total output and 
make the consumers better off. 
 However, the situation changes in the presence of a welfare maximizing uniform 
tax/subsidy policy.2 A uniform tax/subsidy can eliminate the effects of inefficiency due to 
oligopolistic competition, but it cannot eliminate the effect of inefficiency due to cost 
asymmetry. Hence, any change that increases the inefficiency due to cost asymmetry affects 
the consumers adversely. Therefore, a rise in the number of more cost inefficient firms 
reduces consumer surplus in the presence of a uniform tax/subsidy policy. However, more 
cost efficient firms or lower marginal costs of the more cost inefficient firms make the 
consumers better-off. 
 One should not get confused between our result and Lahiri and Ono (1988) and 
Klemperer (1988), which suggest that, higher competition, either due to lower marginal cost 
or due to entry of a firm, always makes the consumers better off, although entry of a more 
cost inefficient firm may reduce welfare. Our result does not support the results of Lahiri and 
Ono (1988) and Klemperer (1988) in the sense that a rise in the number of more cost 
inefficient firms in our analysis makes the consumers worse off. 
 Since the endogenous tax/subsidy policies can be viewed as a way to regulate the 
equilibrium outcomes, our paper can be related to Gans and Quiggin (2003) and Mukherjee 
and Wang (2011), which show respectively that higher competition may hurt the consumers 
in the presence of “regulation with scale economies” and “welfare maximising nationalised 
firm”. Hence, our analysis, along with Gans and Quiggin (2003) and Mukherjee and Wang 
                                                          
2 The consideration of a uniform tax/subsidy can have the following justification. It is often argued that the 
uniform tax rates are simpler and easier to implement. As mentioned in Coşgel (2006, pp. 333) “The cost of 
administering a system with discriminatory rates can be very high when the characteristics of tax payers do not 
differ systematically or when these differences cannot be easily observed. It is generally easier to identify 
differences between the sectors of the economy than within each sector, making it harder to implement 
discriminatory rates within a sector.” 
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(2011), suggests that the price raising effect of competition can be a more common 
phenomenon under regulatory mechanism.3 
 
2. The model and the results 
Consider an economy with ( )1n   firms, each with the marginal cost of production 0, and 
( )1m   firms, each with the marginal cost of production ( )0c  , competing like Cournot 
oligopolists with a homogeneous product. We assume that the welfare maximizing 
government of the country imposes a per-unit tax, t,4 on each firm.  
 We assume that the inverse market demand function is P = a – q, where P is price and 
q is the total output. We show in the Appendix that our result holds under a general demand 
function.  
 We consider the following game. Given the number of firms, at stage 1, the 
government determines t to maximize welfare, which is the sum of total profits of the firms, 
consumer surplus and tax revenue. At stage 2, the firms compete like Cournot oligopolists 
and the profits are realized. We solve the game through backward induction. 
 Given the tax rate, each of the n firms maximizes ( ) ia q t q   to determine its output, 
where 1, 2,...,i n , and each of the m firms maximizes ( ) ja q c t q    to determine its 
output, where 1, 2,...,j n n n m    . The equilibrium outputs of the ith firm, 1, 2,...,i n , 
and the jth firm, 1, 2,...,j n n n m    , can be found as *
1
i
a t mc
q
n m
 

 
 and 
                                                          
3 There are some other papers challenging the price reducing effects of competition. The factors responsible for 
the price raising effects of competition in those papers are consumers’ search costs (Janssen and Moraga-
González, 2004), the presence of the loyal and switching buyer groups (Rosenthal, 1980) and the consumers’ 
preferences for differentiated products (Chen and Riordan, 2008). See also the references in Chen and Riordan 
(2008) for the papers showing the price raising effects of competition in the spatial models of product 
differentiation. In contrast, our result is due to the endogenous tax/subsidy policies, and do not depend on the 
above-mentioned factors. 
4 If t  is negative, it implies that the government is subsidizing the firms. 
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* ( 1)
1
j
a t n c
q
n m
  

 
 respectively. We assume that 0a t mc    and ( 1) 0a t n c    , 
which ensure positive outputs of all firms. 
The total output and price of the product are respectively 
* ( )( )
1
a t n m mc
q
n m
  

 
 and *
( )
1
a t n m mc
P
n m
  

 
.    (1) 
 It is clear from (1) that, for a given tax rate, more firms (regardless of their marginal 
costs) and lower costs of the more cost inefficient firms increase *q , thus making the 
consumers better off. Hence, higher competition makes the consumers better-off under 
exogenous tax/subsidy. 
  Now we show the effects of the strategic tax/subsidy policy. To show this, we solve 
the first stage of the game, where the government determines t to maximize welfare, which is 
the sum of total profits ( ), consumer surplus (CS) and tax revenue (TR). Hence, the 
government maximizes the following expression to determine t: 
* 2
* * * * *
1 1
( )
( ) ( )
2
n n m
i j
t t
i j n TR
CS
q
MaxW Max P t q P c t q tq

  

        ,    (2) 
where * * *
1 1
n n m
i j
i j n
q q q

  
   . 
We get the equilibrium tax rate as *
2
( )
0
( )
m a c an
t
n m
  
 

. Incorporating the 
equilibrium tax rate, we get the equilibrium outputs of the ith firm, 1, 2,...,i n , and the jth 
firm, 1, 2,...,j n n n m    , as *
2
( ) ( 1)
( )
i
a n m mc n m
q
n m
   


 and 
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2
*
2
( )( 1) [( 1)( ) ]
( 1)( )
j
a n m n m c n n m m
q
n m n m
      

  
 respectively. The equilibrium outputs of all 
firms are positive if 
2( )
( )
c m mn n
a a
m n
 
 

, which is assumed to hold. 
 The total equilibrium output is *
mc
q a
n m
 

. Since 
*
2
0
( )
q mc
n n m

 
 
, 
*
2
0
( )
q nc
m n m

  
 
 and 
*
0
( )
q m
c n m

  
 
, the following proposition is immediate. 
 
Proposition 1: (a) An increase in n increases *q , thus making the consumers better-off. 
(b) An increase in m reduces *q , thus making the consumers worse-off.   
(c) A reduction in c increases *q , thus making the consumers better-off . 
 
 The reason for our interesting result, which is Proposition 1(b), is as follows. We have 
seen that, for a given t, an increase in m increases total output. However, if m increases, it 
reduces subsidy (i.e., 
*t ), which tends to reduce the total output. Since the tax policy 
internalizes the inefficiency due to oligopolistic competition but not the inefficiency due to 
the cost asymmetry, an increase in m reduces the total output by reducing subsidy.5 We show 
in the Appendix that this result holds under a general demand function. 
 It is intuitive that if the products are differentiated in our analysis, more firms, 
irrespective of their marginal costs, create a positive effect on the consumers by increasing 
the number of varieties. Hence, the variety effect tends to reduce the negative effect of a rise 
                                                          
5 It is also worth mentioning that we get 
* 2
3
[ ( ) ( )]
0
( )
W nc a m n c m mn n
m m n
     
 
 
 for 0c  , since 
2( )
( )
c m mn n
a
m n
 


 due to the requirement for positive equilibrium outputs. Hence, more cost inefficient 
firms reduces welfare whenever all firms produce positive outputs. 
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in the number of more cost inefficient firms. Therefore, more cost inefficient firms makes the 
consumers worse-off if the products are not very much differentiated so that the inefficiency 
due to the cost asymmetry dominates the effect of product differentiation.  
 It is also worth mentioning that uniform tax/subsidy is important for Proposition 1(b). 
It is intuitive that the government could eliminate the inefficiencies created by oligopolistic 
competition as well as cost asymmetry if it could charge discriminatory tax/subsidies. In this 
situation, the number of firms would not affect the total output and consumer surplus. 
However, as mentioned in the introduction, institutional reasons or the implementation costs 
may be responsible for the uniform tax/subsidy policy, and in the presence of which a rise in 
the number of more cost inefficient firms makes the consumers worse off. 
 Finally, the presence of more cost efficient firms in our analysis does not prevent the 
more cost inefficient firms from entering the industry, implying that there is limited number 
of more cost efficient firms in the industry. However, this may not be the case with free entry 
of more cost efficient firms, where the entire market can be served by the more cost efficient 
firms only. Hence, our analysis is applicable in industries where both types of firms co-exist.   
 
3. Conclusion 
We show that, in an industry with asymmetric cost firms, a rise in the number of more cost 
inefficient firms hurts the consumers in the presence of a welfare maximizing tax/subsidy 
policy. Hence, instead of increasing competition, reducing inefficiency due to cost 
asymmetry may be more desirable under endogenous tax/subsidy policy. 
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Appendix 
Output reducing competition under a general demand function: Assume that the inverse 
market demand function is ( )P q  with 0P   and 0P  .6 Given the tax rate, each of the 
more cost efficient firms and each of the less cost efficient firms maximize the following 
expressions respectively to determine their outputs: 
 ( )
i
i
q
Max P t q ,  1, 2,...,i n                         (A1) 
( )
j
j
q
Max P t c q  , 1, 2,...,j n n n m    .                      (A2) 
The equilibrium outputs are given by the following conditions respectively: 
 * 0iP t P q   , 1, 2,...,i n                           (A3) 
 * 0jP t c P q    , 1, 2,...,j n n n m    .                        (A4) 
The total outputs of the firms are determined by the following expression: 
  *( )( ) 0P t n m mc P q     ,                          (A5) 
where * * *
1 1
n n m
i j
i j n
q q q

  
   , and it depends on t. 
 The government maximizes the following expression to determine the tax rate: 
 
*
*
10
( )
q n m
j
t
j n
Max P q dq c q

 
  .                           (A6) 
The equilibrium tax is determined by the following expression: 
 
*
*
1
0
n m
j
j n
q
q
P c
t t

 


 
 

.                           (A7) 
                                                          
6 Our result holds as long as the industry marginal revenue is downward sloping. Our assumption of 0P   
satisfies this requirement. 
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It follows from (A7) that 
*
0
t
m



, i.e., a rise in the number of more cost inefficient firms 
increases the equilibrium tax, since 
*
1
0
n m
j
j n
q
t

 




 from (A4). 
 Now we want to see the effect of m on the total output. We get from (A5) that 
   
*
* *
*
*
( ) ( )
[ ( 1) ]
t
P t c n m
dq m
dm P n m P q

   

    
.                          (A8) 
Since *[ ( 1) ] 0P n m P q      , we get that 
*
0
dq
dm
  if 
 
*
* *( ) ( ) 0
t
P t c n m
m

    

.                           (A9) 
The sign of (A9) does not depend on the curvature of the demand function, which is given by 
P . Hence, it is immediate that our qualitative result of Proposition 1(b), which is shown 
under a linear demand function (where 0P  ), also occurs under a general demand function 
P(q). The non-linear demand function only affects the quantitative result by making 0P  . 
 It is immediate from (A9) that if the tax rate is exogenous, we have 
*
0
t
m



 and (A9) 
does not hold since * *( ) 0P t c    from (A4). That is, for a given tax rate, a rise in the 
number of more cost inefficient firms increases total output. However, if the government 
chooses welfare maximizing tax, a rise in the number of more cost inefficient firms reduces 
total output by making 
*
0
t
m



. 
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